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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GRAYCE HURD, Personal 
Representative of the Estate 
of Lloyd I. Hurd, Deceased 
and GRAYCE HURD, Personally, ] 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
vs. 
LEWELLYN J. SHERMAN and 
CONNIE SHERMAN, 
Defendants/Appellants. ] 
I Court of Appeals No. 970202CA 
i Civil No: 940600001 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE 
I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is properly before this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. 578-2-2(4) (Supp. 1996) and §78-2a-3(2)(j), and pursuant 
to Rule App. P. 3. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether plaintiff, Grayce Hurd, as personal 
representative of the Estate of Lloyd Hurd, can bring and maintain 
an action against the defendants, and whether the Estate of Lloyd 
Hurd itself can bring and maintain an action against the 
defendants. 
1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. See Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 
138 (Utah App. 1989). 
B. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that a 
constructive trust had been created for the benefit of plaintiff. 
1. Standard of Review 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
C. Whether the trial court erred when it found there was no 
consideration for the quitclaim deed, the checks and vehicle 
titles. 
1. Standard of Review 
The standard of review is whether the finding is clearly 
erroneous. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987). 
D. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that all 
of the property should be immediately returned to the plaintiff. 
1. Standard of Review 
Conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. 
BMG Corp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
E. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
prove the plaintiffs' claims. 
1. Standard of Review 
Correction of error standard. Bailey v. Call. 767 P.2d 138 
(Utah App. 1989). 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case. 
IV. STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant's appeal from a final Judgment and Order of the 
Sixth Judicial District Court, Kane County, State of Utahf entered 
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by the Honorable David L. Mower. The Order was entered after a 
bench trial on April 4, 1996. The Court ordered that a 
constructive trust created by the parties was terminated, and that 
the items transferred to the defendants or either of them, as 
constructive trustees, shall be delivered to the plaintiff Grayce 
Hurd within a ten (10) day period from the date of the Court's 
Order. In addition, plaintiff was given judgment against the 
defendants for the sum of $20,000.00 for funds taken by defendants 
and for costs. See Appellant's Addendum A. 
B. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The parties to this action are Grayce Hurd hereinafter 
referred to as "Grayce" individually and Grayce Hurd as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of Lloyd I. Hurd. The deceased is 
hereinafter referred to as "Lloyd". The defendants are Lewellyn J. 
Sherman, hereinafter referred to as "Lewellyn" and Connie Sherman, 
hereinafter referred to as "Connie". Grayce is the mother of 
defendant Lewellyn and mother-in-law of defendant Connie. 
References are made in this statement to admitted exhibits and 
the indexed record numbered by the District Clerk. In addition, 
references to testimony of witnesses are made to the reporter's 
transcript identified as "Tr." followed by the page and "L." 
designating the lines of the testimony. 
Lloyd and Grayce commenced living together in 1964 and have 
held one another out as wife and husband since that time. Lloyd 
and Grayce did not enter into a formal marriage contract. Lloyd 
and Grayce filed joint Federal and State Income Tax returns 
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designating themselves as married and filing jointly (See Exhibits 
1 and 2). Lloyd and Grayce acquired a home in Kanab, Utah on the 
6th day of June, 1985, designating themselves as husband and wife 
and as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship (See Exhibit 
4). The home was purchased for a total of $17,000. (See Exhibit 
11). Grayce contributed $15,000 to the purchase and Lloyd 
contributed $2,000 (Transcript 14). Lloyd and Grayce also 
accumulated: two shares of stock in the Kanab Irrigation Company 
issued to Lloyd or Grayce Hurd (Exhibit 7) ; a travel trailer, 
fifth-wheel type, Teton Brand 1978 model (See Exhibit 5); a travel 
trailer 18 feet long, Kit Companion brand; a 1977 Chevrolet pickup 
truck; 1980 Oldsmobile automobile; bank account at Zions First 
National Bank, Kanab office, Account No. 052-50552-6, with account 
balance of $20,420.85 (See Exhibit 24, Finding #9, R. 144). 
On May 4, 1992, Lloyd was critically ill and dying of cancer. 
Grayce took Lloyd to the Veterans Hospital in Salt Lake City for 
treatment. Grayce then stayed in the home of Lewellyn and Connie 
while she was in Salt Lake. 
Later Lloyd left the V.A. Hospital and also stayed at the home 
of Lewellyn and Connie. On or about May 27 or May 28, 1992, it was 
apparent that "Lloyd was really getting bad." He was in a 
wheelchair and on oxygen (Tr. 35-L. 4 & 5). 
Lloyd, Grayce, Connie and Lewellyn started discussing the need 
to get all of the property out of the names of Grayce and Lloyd. 
Grayce testified: 
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And all our things that was, everything, the vehicles and 
everything was in both names had to be transferred out of 
our names because if we put Lloyd in a rest-home, they 
would - the State would take everything. (Tr. 36-L. 9-11) 
The question was asked: "who was saying there was a problem with 
the property, with your owning property?" (Tr. 36-L. 14) Answer 
by: (Grayce) "Connie and Lewellyn". Grayce testified "she 
(Connie) said I would also lose my Social Security and everything 
if everything wasn't deeded out of my name. And Lewellyn okayed 
it, he said, yes it would." Lewellyn also stated "that's true, 
Mom. We got to look in his Social Security first and then get 
everything out of your name." (Tr. 37-L. 13) 
The four parties then discussed the method of getting the 
property out of the names of Lloyd and Grayce. Lewellyn called an 
attorney and asked if he would come over to the home "to give 
Lewellyn the power of attorney." (Tr. 39-L. 3) Grayce said 
"Lloyd, if that's what you want, why, we would trust them with 
that." (Tr. 39-L. 7-8) 
Grayce continued: "Lloyd also talked to Lewellyn about it and 
said 'I want to know that Grayce will be taken care of.'" Lewellyn 
responded "I'll see she's taken care of" and he turned to me and 
asked me "Mom, do you trust me? Do you trust me?" and he said that 
several times and I said, "if I can't trust one of my children, who 
can I trust?" (Tr. 39-L. 15) 
Attorney Keith Eddington came to the home with a prepared 
general power of attorney and had it executed by Lloyd on the 29th 
of May, 1992. (See Exhibit 23) Eddington testified that he 
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explained to Lloyd and those present that the signing of the power 
of attorney would permit "Lewellyn to do anything in his (Lloyd's) 
behalf. That he could transfer ownership to himself of all his 
(Lloyd's) property, he could get his cash assets." (Tr. 107-L. 8). 
Eddington testified "well, he (Lloyd) did want to give the power of 
attorney to Lewellyn because he said he trusted him." Eddington 
further stated: "and he trusted Lewellyn with Grayce." (Tr. 108-L. 
21) 
Connie brought the power of attorney form to Eddington and 
Eddington filled in the form in his own hand. The following 
testimony developed at trial: 
Q. (Olsen) Now, if he was going to give his property there 
was no reason for any trust was there? Lewellyn could do 
anything he wanted. 
A. That's true. 
Q. Now, if there was a trust relationship, did he tell you 
what he wanted accomplished? 
A. Not in specifics. He did make statements regarding 
Lewellyn's concern for his mother and I gathered from 
what he was saying it was more his financial position 
than anything else... 
Q. Now from what you tell me, did you gather that Lloyd was 
doing this, transferring the property to preserve it, to 
see that his wife Grayce was taken care of? 
A. I believe that was part of it... 
Q. But then did he tell you that he trusted Lew? 
A. Uh huh (affirmative). 
A. I think there was more concern about the State, quite 
honestly, than the other kids. But that would have been 
one of the concerns was that Grayce was taken care of. 
Lloyd executed the power of attorney on the 29th of May, 1992 
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and died on the 3rd of June, 1992 (See death certificate - Exhibit 
13) . 
Kenneth Lamb, a defense witness discussed the trust 
relationship in the following examination: 
By Mr. Olsen (Tr. 126) 
Q. Mr. Lamb, when you were talking with Lloyd Hurd did he 
ever tell you why he needed to trust Lewellyn? 
A. All he told me was he couldn't trust any of the rest of 
his family. I don't know what his reasons were. 
Q. But he said that he could trust Lewellyn? 
A. Lewellyn and his wife, yes. 
Q. So, apparently, he was trusting him to do something? 
A. I would think. 
On Monday Grayce and Lewellyn went directly to the Kanab 
branch of Zions Bank to make arrangements to take out the funds 
from Account No. 052-50552-6. 
On Tuesday, June 2, 1992 Lewellyn drew checks on the account. 
Check 101 was made payable to himself as payee for $10,000 and 
signed Lloyd I. Hurd, by Lewellyn Sherman. A second check numbered 
102 was made payable to Connie Sherman for $10,000 and signed Lloyd 
I. Hurd by Lewellyn Sherman. A copy of the power of attorney was 
presented with the checks. An account was opened at the bank in 
the name of Lewellyn Sherman and Connie Sherman with Lewellyn 
Sherman's signature authorized. Both $10,000 checks were deposited 
into the newly opened account. (Tr. 168-L. 11-25) 
They went from the bank to a title company. Grayce paid to 
have a quit-claim deed prepared. (Tr. 46-L. 10) Grayce and 
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Lewellyn signed the deed and offered it for recording. The 
grantors on the deed were Lloyd I. Hurd and Grayce Hurd, husband 
and wife with Lewellyn J. Sherman and Connie Sherman, husband and 
wife as joint tenants with full rights of survivorship as grantees. 
The deed was signed Lloyd I. Hurd by Lewellyn J. Sherman, his 
attorney in fact and by Grayce Hurd, individually. (See Exhibit 21) 
Grayce paid for the recording of the deed. (Tr. 47-L. 10) 
Grayce and Lewellyn then went to the Tax Commission Office in 
Kanab where Grayce signed the titles to the 1977 Chevrolet pickup, 
the fifth-wheel and the 18 foot trailer. The titles were 
transferred. Grayce paid all of the transfer fees. (Tr. 91-L. 8-
20) 
The property transferred consisted of all the property owned 
by Grayce Hurd and Lloyd I. Hurd. 
The terms of Lewellyn's trust obligation to his mother were 
ratified by Lewellyn in conversations between himself, his mother, 
his sister Iris and his brother Paul. Grayce talked to Lewellyn 
shortly after Lloyd's funeral. 
I said, well now that Lloyd isn't in the rest home or 
anything, I said, let's turn everything back to me. 
Lewellyn said, we'd better wait and see what your Social 
Security is going to be. We will wait a year. ... (Tr. 
52-L.9) 
Grayce: 
Well, we talked about it later and he said just wait a 
year and then he'd turn everything back to me. ... After 
the year was up, I said, "Well I've waited a year now. 
How about turning that back to me and get my name." And 
he said, ,f— I'm not giving you anything back until 
you're — while your name is on Paul's truck because he 
could have a wreck and you could lose everything we 
have." (Tr. 52-L.17) 
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Immediately prior to Lloyd's funeral in Kanab on the 7th of 
June, 1992, Paul had a conversation with Connie. Connie stated "If 
anything happens to Lew, or Lew doesn't turn things back in your 
mom's name, I'll make sure it gets back in her name." (Tr. 76-
L.16) Paul also heard one discussion between Lewellyn and Grayce 
at the time of Lloyd's funeral: 
Well Lewellyn was explaining to my mom about her Social 
Security, losing that, and he would say; do you trust me? 
Leave it in my name for a year and I will sign everything 
back to you and within a year everything should be out of 
danger of whatever he was trying to convince. (Tr. 77, 
L. 20) 
Later towards the end of 1992 a conversation was held between 
Paul and Lewellyn in Richfield in June of 1992. 
I told him mom's car was failing on her ... and he got 
hot-headed and said "Paul, don't worry, I'll get things 
back in mom's name" and left. 
Iris Meir stated: 
On June 8, her mother (Grayce) and her brother Lewellyn came 
to her home. (Tr. 86-L. 21) We set around the table out on the 
patio and this is when they let me know what had taken place with 
the property ... (Tr. 86-L. 23) He (Lewellyn) told me that Lloyd 
had given him the power of attorney so it would be sure that my 
mother had something to fall back on if something would happen to 
him. I told Lewellyn that was fine and I told my mother also, that 
what they had done was fine with me because at the time Lewellyn 
was the only one close to Salt Lake that was available to help with 
the matter. (Tr. 87-L. 2-6) 
Iris Meir testified: 
He said, Iris, I want to wait one year and make sure that 
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everything is settled down and okay and then this property, he 
said, will be back in our mother's name so that she can run 
her own affairs and not have to depend on anybody. (Tr. 87-L. 
8-12) 
Yes. Lewellyn told me, he said whenever Mom needs something, 
I've got this check - he said I've got her money in this 
special account and he had a checkbook. He said all I have to 
do is write out a check for whatever she needs. I didn't get 
a good look at the checkbook but that is what he told me. He 
had a special account for my mother. (Tr. 90-L. 9-12) 
Defendant Connie reaffirmed the testimony of her brother-in-
law Paul: (Tr. 138-L. 18-22). 
Q. (Mr. Ludlow) Madam there's been some testimony about you 
having some conversations with relatives after the 
transferring of the property had occurred. First, as to 
Paul Sherman, did you every have a conversation with him 
about turning the property over? 
A. I did say that. You know, I think that, I said if 
anything happens to Lew, I didn't want to be a part of 
it. I didn't. 
Lewellyn has spent all of the $20,000 cash which was taken. 
He was asked: (Tr. 175-L.16-17) 
Q. (Olsen) You have spent it all? 
A. Well, it has been spent for one thing or another, yes. 
At the conclusion of the case the Court ruled Lewellyn was a 
trustee of a constructive trust created for the benefit of his 
mother (Grayce). The Decree, Judgment and Order required the home 
be conveyed to the Plaintiff together with the two shares of 
irrigation stock and the travel trailer, house trailer, 1977 Chev 
pickup, and 1980 Oldsmobile automobile. 
Judgment for the $20,000 was awarded to Plaintiff since 
Defendants have disposed of the money. 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Grayce and Lloyd transferred all of the property, as well as 
all of the funds they owned to Lewellyn and Connie. The property 
was transferred without consideration because Grayce and Lloyd were 
told by Defendants they must get the property out of their names or 
the State would take it from them. Defendants also advised Grayce 
she could lose her Social Security if the property was held in her 
name. Lloyd signed a power of attorney designating Lewellyn as his 
attorney in fact and Lewellyn made the transfers. Grayce was able 
to go with Lewellyn and make such assignments, deed executions and 
did such other things as were necessary to transfer property 
interests. 
The execution and use of the power of attorney created a 
principal-agent fiduciary relationship. The mother and son and 
daughter-in-law relationship created a presumption of a 
confidential relationship. Therefore, the burden of proof was upon 
the Defendants to show their actions were fair and equitable. 
Defendants were obligated to hold the property for the benefit 
of Lloyd and Grayce during his lifetime. Upon Lloyds death, the 
property was to be returned within one year to Grayce. Lloyd died 
on the 3rd day of June, 1992 and to this date Defendants have 
refused to return Plaintiff's property. 
A constructive trust was found to exist because of the 
fiduciary relationship. Defendants have not been able to marshall 
evidence to impeach the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment of the 
District Court. 
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VI. ARGUMENTS 
A. THE PLAINTIFF, 6RAYCE HURD, AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF 
THE ESTATE OF MR. HURD (LLOYD) CORRECTLY BROUGHT AND 
MAINTAINED AN ACTION AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS. 
Appellants raise for the first time on appeal the question of 
whether the plaintiff as a personal representative of the estate of 
Lloyd is a real party in interest. The basis for the argument is 
that a formal marriage contract was not entered into between Grayce 
and Lloyd and suggests that she must be found to be the "surviving 
spouse" of Lloyd in order to have a real interest. Section 75-3-
203(1)(d) is cited to support their argument. 
The answer of Defendants filed in the matter admits the 
appointment of Grayce as the Personal Representative of the estate 
of Lloyd (See J 1 of Answer - R.12). Section 75-3-203 establishes 
priority among persons seeking appointment as Personal 
Representative of an estate and has no application in these 
proceedings. The appointment was made upon appropriate probate 
petition and Letters Testamentary were issued to Grayce. There has 
been no objection filed in the probate proceedings. She is the 
appointed and qualified person to marshall the assets of the estate 
and to supervise the distribution of these assets to the heirs 
entitled to such distribution. Defendants (Lewellyn and Connie) 
have no standing in this separate proceedings to challenge the 
appointment. 
A person is not disqualified to act as a Personal 
Representative merely because she claims property which is also 
claimed by the estate. (See Farnsworth v. Hatch, 47 Utah 62, 151 
12 
P.537 [1915]). 
A personal representative has the obligation to "receive 
assets from fiduciaries" (75-3-714[2]). Therefore Grayce was 
obligated to seek a court determination for the recovery of assets 
held by Defendant and also to secure a determination as to the 
division of those assets between herself and the estate of Lloyd 
Hurd, deceased. 
Since a District Court found a resulting trust wherein the 
trustees held the assets for the benefit of Grayce, all of the 
assets are required to be returned to her. 
Considerable evidence was presented to the District Court 
concerning the relationship of Grayce and Lloyd. They were 
together for a period of approximately thirty (30) years. However, 
the purpose of the evidence was to show the relationship between 
the parties, their joint investment and ownership of properties, 
and their contributions to the resulting trust as well as 
demonstrating Lloyd's interest in designating Grayce as a 
beneficiary under the trust. 
The foregoing issue is not only moot, it is also not material. 
Further, it is not an issue raised in the pleadings nor was it 
presented to the trial court. The issue cannot be raised for the 
first time on appeal (Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign Company, 
[1978 Utah] 586 P.2d 416; Hanover Limited v. Fields 568 P.2d 75 
[1977 Utah]). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST 
HAD BEEN CREATED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy which arises by 
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operation of law to prevent unjust enrichment. Accordingly, parol 
evidence may be introduced to establish a constructive trust, 
Ashton v. Ashtonf 733 P.2D 147 (Utah 1987). 
Ashton cites the following from the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts §45 (1957): 
Effect of Failure of Oral Trust for a Third Person 
(1) Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it 
inter vivos to another in trust for a third person, but 
no memorandum properly evidencing the intention to create 
a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, 
and the transferee refuses to perform the trust, the 
transferee holds the interest upon a constructive trust 
for the third person, if, but only if, 
(b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a 
confidential relation to the transferor. 
It follows that in order to find a constructive trust 
existing, the lower court found a confidential relationship. 
The Wyoming case of Fuller v. Fuller, 606 P.2d 306 addressed 
this situation and stated: 
We have held that a trust is an obligation arising out of 
a confidence reposed in a person to apply property 
faithfully. (Citations omitted) We have said that a 
trust - in its technical sense is an obligation of a 
person arising out of a confidence reposed in him to 
apply property faithfully and according to such 
confidence. A trust, is a fiduciary relationship in 
which one person is the holder of titled property subject 
to an equitable obligation to keep or use property for 
the benefit of another. 
In Ashton the Supreme Court of Utah made similar observations, 
at page 151: 
In Parks, we described an express trust as a fiduciary 
relationship with respect to property, arising as a 
result of a manifestation of intent to create it and 
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subjecting the person in whom title is vested to 
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of 
others. 
A confidential relationship between Grayce and her son 
Lewellyn and daughter-in-law Connie was plead in Plaintiff's 
Complaint. The District Court found the parent and child 
relationship between the parties which shifted the burden of proof. 
See record 145 and 146 - Findings 1, 2 and 3. 
In Baker v. Pattee. Utah Supreme Court (1984) 684 P.2d 632 it 
was held: 
A confidential relationship is presumed between parent 
and child, attorney and client and trustee and cestui que 
trust. Blodaett v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 
Baker also held: 
Where a confidential relationship exists, a presumption 
of unfairness arises which must be overcome by 
countervailing evidence, and the burden shifts to the 
Defendant to prove absence of unfairness by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Robertson v. Campbe11, 
674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1993) ... 
The District Court after hearing all of the evidence 
determined a trust did exist and Lewellyn agreed: 
I'll keep all of the property for a year. Mom can apply 
for Social Security. If nobody says anything for a year, 
then we should be safe and I'll give all the property 
back to her. In the meantime, she can continue living in 
the house. (R. 141) 
Findings of Fact 33 and 34 of the District Court (R. 138) 
were: 
33. More than one year had passed since Lloyd's 
death. 
34. No claims had been made by Social Security, Veteran's 
Administration or any other Medicare or long-term provider. 
Based upon these findings the Court made the following 
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Conclusions of Law: 
1. A constructive trust was created for the benefit of the 
Plaintiff. (R. 138) 
Not only did Defendant have the obligation of meeting the 
shifted burden of proof because of the confidential relationship, 
the evidence as to the trust was convincing. Attention is invited 
to Appellee's Statement of Facts and the Findings and Conclusions 
of the lower court. It is impressive to observe summary statements 
of the witnesses. 
Plaintiff's witnesses stated: 
1. Gravce Hurd testified as to the discussions leading to 
the transfer of the property and that all of the property 
owned by herself and Lloyd was transferred to Lewellyn 
and Connie without consideration. Grayce paid all 
expenses in making the transfers. 
She further testified concerning the representations of 
Lewellyn in accepting the trust that he would hold the 
property for her benefit and transfer it back to her 
after a year. 
2. Iris Meir (sister of Lewellyn) stated Lewellyn said: I 
want to wait one year and make sure that everything is 
settled down and okay and then this property will be back 
in Mother's name so that she can run her own affairs and 
not have to be dependent on anybody (Tr. 87-L. 8-12). 
Also, I've got her money in this special account and all 
I have to do is write out a check for whatever she needs. 
3. Paul Sherman (Lewellyn's brother) had several 
conversations with Lewellyn in which Lewellyn ratified 
his trust responsibility. He was told "Paul don't worry, 
I'll get things back in Mom's name." ... And 
I will sign everything back to her within a year. 
Everything should be out of danger ... 
Statement by Connie to Paul on the day of Lloyd's funeral 
(7th of June, 1992): Connie said: 
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If anything happens to Lew, or Lew doesn't turn 
things back in your Mom's name, I'll make sure it 
gets back in her name. 
Defendant's witnesses all agreed that there was a trust 
relationship between the parties. 
1. Keith Eddinaton stated: 
Well he (Lloyd) did want to give the power of 
attorney to Lewellyn because he said he trusted 
him. 
Q. Now if it was a trust relationship, did he tell you what 
he wanted accomplished? 
A. Not in specifics. He did make statements regarding 
Lewellyn's concern for his mother and I gathered from 
what he was saying it was more his financial position 
than anyone else ... 
He also stated: 
But that would have been one of his concerns was 
Grayce was taken care of. 
2. Kenneth Lamb acknowledged that Lloyd trusted Lewellyn and 
his wife and that he was therefor trusting Lewellyn to do something 
(Tr. 126). 
3. Defendant Lewellyn. He planned to allow his mother to 
continue residing in the home. (Tr. 164 - L. 11-13). 
He transferred back to his mother a trailer. 
4. Defendant Connie acknowledged she had told her brother-
in-law Paul Sherman that, "If anything happens to Lew, or if Lew 
doesn't turn things back to your mom's name, I'll make sure it gets 
back in her name." (Tr. 76-L. 16-19) She said "I did say that." 
(Tr. 138-L. 21) 
The evidence outlined is not only substantial but mandated a 
finding of a constructive trust. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THERE WAS NO 
CONSIDERATION FOR THE QUIT-CLAIM DEED, MONEY TRANSFERS, 
OR VEHICLE TRANSFERS. 
The trial court made Finding 25: 
Neither Lewellyn nor Connie paid money for, nor 
transferred anything of value to Grayce in exchange (for) 
the quit-claim deed, the checks or the vehicles titles. 
Grayce's paid for: attorney Eddington's services in preparing 
the power of attorney. (See Tr. 40-L. 12# Cost $50.00); preparing 
the deed by the title company, cost $10.00. (Tr. 46-L. 9); the 
recording of the quit-claim deed (Tr. 47-L. 10); the transfer of 
motor vehicle titles and new license costs (Tr. 51-L. 20). 
Lewellyn and Connie paid nothing to Grayce or to Lloyd and 
offered no evidence of consideration. In Baker, supra the 
following appears at page 634: 
This Court will disturb the Findings of Fact in equity 
cases only where the evidence clearly preponderates 
against them. Brown v. Love1and, Utah, 678 P.2d 292 
(1984); Del Porto v. Nicolo. 27 Utah 2nd 286, 495 P.2d 
811 (1972); First Security Bank of Utah NA v. Hall. 29 
Utah 2nd 24, 504 P.2d 995 (1992). We are not bound to 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, and 
because of its advantaged position, we give considerable 
deference to Findings and Judgment. Gillmore v. 
Gillmore. Utah, 657 P.2d 736 (1982); Jensen v. Brown. 
Utah 639 P.2d 150 (1981); Paaano v. Walker. Utah 539 P.2d 
452 (1975). 
Appellant does argue consideration was either given or it was 
not necessary since the transfers were gifts. 
A review of the evidence demonstrates that gifts were not 
intended. The property was to be held in trust for the benefit of 
Lloyd and Grayce during his lifetime. Upon the death of Lloyd, 
Grayce was the sole beneficiary. The self-serving notation written 
by Lewellyn on the checks did not change the demonstrated intent of 
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the parties. 
The District Court was not persuaded Grayce had received 
adequate consideration because she was permitted to live in her own 
home. Her continued possession supported her testimony that she 
was the equitable owner of the home. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ALL OP THE 
PROPERTY SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY RETURNED. 
All of the worldly possessions accumulated by Grayce and Lloyd 
were held in trust by Lewellyn and Connie. Grayce had been 
attempting to secure the needed return of the property since the 
year of 1993. Lewellyn had not returned the property and had 
exhausted all of the cash reserve transferred to him. The terms of 
the trust had been met and Lewellyn kept imposing unreasonable 
delays. Equity and justice required the immediate return of the 
property. 
1. A Life Estate Was Not Created. 
Appellants ignore the overwhelming evidence as to the terms of 
the trust and argue the terms were different than found by the 
District Court. Appellants argue Grayce had only a life estate in 
the assets and therefore legal title must continue to be held for 
Lewellyn/s benefit as a remainderman. 
The argument places a strained interpretation on the evidence 
offered in the District Court and is contrary to the Findings of 
the Court. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held Findings of 
a lower Court will not be disturbed when supported by reasonable 
and competent evidence. See Baker v. Pattee, supra. 
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2. The Severance of the Joint Tenancy 
Appellant argues a joint tenancy is terminated by conveyance 
and for that reason grantees receive unimpeachable title. We 
believe the argument is without merit. 
While the grantees hold legal title to property in question, 
the equitable title is held by Grayce and she has the right to have 
the trust terminated. 
A constructive trust was imposed because of the breach of a 
fiduciary relationship. The trustees refused to return the 
property which in equity and good conscience must be returned. 
Retention of the property by Lewellyn would result in his unjust 
enrichment. 
In this case Appellants retain title to the mother's property 
through an abuse of confidence. The trust should be immediately 
distributed to the equitable owner. 
E. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff's Complaint (R-9-5) does state a cause of action 
which resulted because of a breach of a confidential relationship. 
The District Court found a constructive trust existed between the 
parties. The decision further ordered all of the property returned 
to Grayce since she is the beneficiary under the trust. 
1. Evidence Supporting Plaintiff's Claim of Confidential 
Relationship. 
The sufficiency of the evidence has been demonstrated in the 
Statement of Facts and argued under each of the proceeding points 
of argument. 
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Again it should be noted that constructive trusts result 
because of a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, Volume 1 §155, page 210 states: 
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose 
of working out right and justice, where there was no 
intention of the parties to create such a relationship 
• • • 
If one party obtains legal title to property ... in any 
... unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably 
retain the property which really belongs to another, 
equity carries out its theory of a double ownership, 
equity and legal, by impressing a constructive trust upon 
the property in favor of the one who is in good 
conscience entitled to it, and who is considered in 
equity as the beneficial owner ... 
In Scott on Trusts 2317, §462.2 it is stated: 
A constructive trust, as I have said, is imposed in order 
to prevent unjust enrichment. This unjust enrichment may 
rise out of a wrongful acquisition of the title to 
property ... A constructive trust may arise, however, 
even though the acquisition of the property was not 
wrongful. It arises where the retention of the property 
would result in the unjust enrichment of the person 
retaining it. So it is said that to establish such a 
trust it is not necessary to show intentional fraud. 
Tate v. Emery. 139 Or. 214, 9 P.2d 136. Teuscher v. 
Gragg, 136 Ok. 129, 276 P 735, 66 ALR 143; Ryan v. Plath, 
18 Wa. 2d 839, 140 P.2d 968; Cook v. Elmore. 27 Wyo. 163, 
192 P 824. [Emphasis added.] 
In addition to the foregoing reasons for declaring a 
constructive trust when a fiduciary has violated a trust of 
confidence, this Court has made a specific determination concerning 
relationships where a fudiciary relationship is presumed. A 
confidential relationship is presumed between parent and child (See 
Baker v. Pattee. supra). 
The fiduciary relationship existing between the parties was 
further demonstrated by the execution of the power of attorney and 
the acceptance and use of that power of attorney by Lewellyn. The 
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Kansas Supreme Court in Kline v. Orebaugh, 519 P.2d 691 (Kan. 1974) 
was confronted with facts similar to those in this case. Parents 
had executed a power of attorney to their son. The resulting 
principal and agent fiduciary relationship was considered. The 
Court determined a confidential relationship existing between the 
parties. The Court at page 695 stated: 
[1-5] At the outset it would be helpful to review some of 
the basic rights and obligations which came into 
existence when W.D. and Minnie B. Orebaugh executed their 
powers of attorney to their son, Roy. The relation of 
principal and agent is a fiduciary one, and if a wrong 
arises because of the conduct of the agent the same 
remedy exists against the wrongdoer on behalf of the 
principal as would exist against a trustee on behalf of 
the cestui que trust. fWolcott & Lincoln, Inc. v Butler, 
155 Kan 105, 122 P.2d 720.) In this case Roy Orebaugh 
having obtained a power of attorney from each of his 
parents was their agent. There existed a confidential 
relation between them. The execution of the powers of 
attorney was induced by that relation and Roy Orebaugh 
violated the confidence reposed in him by his parents. 
2. Evidence Does Support Plaintiff's Claim of Constructive 
Fraud. 
Appellant cites the elements required for a Finding of common 
law fraud and argues Plaintiff's burden of proof has not been met 
in the District Court. 
The argument is without merit. A fiduciary and confidential 
relationship existed between the parties and a constructive trust 
was imposed. Plaintiff transferred to a son and daughter-in-law, 
without consideration, all of their assets for a specific purpose. 
The term of the trust (or purpose) had been met and the trustees 
have refused to return the property. 
In addition to the general evidence creating the trust, the 
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District Court considered the breached confidential relationship 
created by the parents trust of a child, the fiduciary relationship 
created by execution of a power of attorney and the transfer of all 
of their property to the child without consideration. The trust 
relationship shifted the burden of proof and required the 
Defendants to show fairness. The Defendants were not able to show 
they were equitable and fair. Therefore, the District Court found 
a constructive trust. 
As noted under other headings of this Brief, the evidence 
mandated the result reached by the District Court. The Appellants 
have not been able to marshall evidence to the contrary. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Grayce and Lloyd conveyed all of their worldly possessions in 
trust to Lewellyn and Connie for protection against imagined 
problems. The "problems" were brought to their attention by Connie 
and by Lewellyn. Lewellyn recommended the problems would be solved 
by Defendants holding title to all property for a period of one 
year after Lloyd's death. Lloyd wanted to protect the property for 
himself and Grayce and for Grayce in the event of his death. No 
consideration was paid by Lewellyn and Connie for the transfer of 
the property. Grayce paid all of the costs for.property transfers. 
Under the developed facts, the trial court correctly determined a 
constructive trust existed and Grayce was the beneficiary. 
Equity and good conscience require the termination of the 
constructive trust and the return of the property to the 
beneficiary. 
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We respectfully submit the Decree, Judgment and Order of the 
District Court should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 1st day of July, 1997. 
OLSEN & CHAMBERLAIN 
By_ 
TE3t K. OLSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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